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  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
   Plaintiff Shawn Sharp, an inmate in the custody of 
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), 
brought this civil rights action in November 2000 claiming 
that two prison facilities (SCI-Pittsburgh and SCI-Greene) 
unlawfully denied his request to accommodate his particular 
religious group.1
                                                 
1 Eleven defendants testified at the bench trial in this matter.  
They were Philip Johnson, William Stickman, Joel Dickson, 
Mark Krysevig, Rhoda Winstead, Father William Terza and 
Imam Tanko Ibrahiym, who were assigned to SCI-Pittsburgh 
during all times relevant to the respective allegations made by 
Sharp, and William Stickman, Brian Coleman, Jean Mears, 
Father George Moneck and Imam Abu Bakr Muhammad, 
who were assigned to SCI-Greene.  All of these individuals 
are Appellees in this matter.  The remaining seven defendants 
did not testify at trial and include Conner Blain, Lieutenant 
Blakey, Lieutenant Fisher, Melvin Lockett, Lieutenant 
Matcus, John Miller and Paul Stowitzky. 
  After years of motions practice, in which 
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several of Sharp’s claims were dismissed, Sharp’s remaining 
two claims proceeded to a three-day bench trial before the 
Magistrate Judge.2
I.  BACKGROUND 
  They were: (1) a claim pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants’ policies and practices violated 
Sharp’s right to practice his religion as guaranteed by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments (the “First Amendment 
Action”); and (2) a claim pursuant to the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc 
(2000) (the “RLUIPA Action”).  The Magistrate Judge 
entered judgment in favor of Defendants and issued a 
memorandum setting forth her findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  We will affirm.     
Sharp is serving a life term of imprisonment following 
his conviction for first degree murder.  He was incarcerated at 
SCI-Pittsburgh from September 18, 1998 to May 23, 2001.  
Sharp was transferred to SCI-Greene and was incarcerated 
there from May 23, 2001 to June 13, 2006, when he was 
transferred to SCI-Dallas.   
                                                                                                             
 
2 The parties consented to have the Magistrate Judge conduct 
all proceedings in this case, including entry of final judgment, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. 
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A.  SCI-PITTSBURGH 
1. RELIGIOUS SERVICES OFFERED AND                                                      
POLICIES FOR REQUESTING RELIGIOUS 
ACCOMMODATIONS     
SCI-Pittsburgh recognizes and accommodates several 
different religions and religious groups, namely Christians, 
Jews, and Muslims.  With respect to Christianity, SCI-
Pittsburgh offers Catholic, Protestant, and Jehovah’s 
Witnesses services.  As to Islam, SCI-Pittsburgh offers 
Nation of Islam, Moorish Science Temple, and Sunni Muslim 
services.      
An inmate practicing a religion not covered by the 
aforementioned groups may request an accommodation.  DC-
Administrative 819 (“DC-ADM 819”) sets forth the DOC’s 
policy for requesting recognition of a religion and obtaining 
services for that group.  The version of DC-ADM 819  that 
was in effect from March 2, 1998 until July 15, 2002 stated, 
in pertinent part, that: 
Requests to engage in religious practices . . . 
which are not being accommodated by the 
[DOC], must be initiated by the inmate via an 
‘Inmate Religious Accommodation Request 
Form’ . . . .  The form shall be completed by the 
requesting inmate and submitted to the Facility 
Chaplaincy Program Director for review by 
appropriate staff.   
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The Inmate Religious Accommodation Request Form, also 
known as DC-52, stated that “[i]f more than one inmate is 
filing a request, each inmate must submit a form.  If this is a 
group request, information must be submitted to the Facility 
Chaplaincy Program Director, who will compile information 
about the group request.”  After the inmate submits this form, 
the prison’s chaplain director must obtain publications from 
the faith group regarding the goals, beliefs and practices of 
that group.  The chaplain then circulates a recommendation 
form to certain prison officials, each of whom makes a 
written recommendation as to whether the request should be 
granted or denied.  The chaplain then forwards the prisoner’s 
request, the compiled religious information, and the staff 
recommendations to the Administrator of Religion and 
Family Services at the DOC central office, who ultimately 
determines whether to approve or deny the request.   
2.  SHARP’S INCARCERATION AND ACCOMMODATION 
REQUEST AT SCI-PITTSBURGH  
Sharp is a member of the faith group known as Ahlus 
Sunnati Wal Jama‘ah, whose members are frequently referred 
to as Sunni Muslims.  There are different subsets within the 
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broader Sunni Muslim group.  Sharp identifies himself as a 
member of the Habashi sect.3
The Islamic Chaplains testified that Muslims at the 
prison typically take part in Jumah and Taleem.  Jumah is a 
group prayer service held on Fridays that every Muslim is 
obligated to attend if possible.  Taleem is a religious study 
period that is generally held on a weekly basis though there is 
no religious obligation to attend.  Defendant Tanko Ibrahiym, 
the Islamic Chaplain at SCI-Pittsburgh from 1998 to 2004 and 
a self-identified Sunni Muslim, led Jumah services and 
       
                                                 
3 Testimony from Imam Muhammad and exhibits introduced 
at trial provided general background information regarding 
the Habashi sect.  Pursuant to this information, the Habashis 
are followers of Abdullah Alharrari Alhabashi, an Ethiopian 
who settled and taught in Lebanon.  The Habashi are 
offspring of the Al-Ashari community, which was founded by 
Abu-Hasan Al-Ashari around the year 860 A.D.   
One of the purported differences between the Habashi 
sect of Sunni Islam and other Sunni sects is the direction of 
prayer.  As a precondition for a Muslim’s prayers to be valid, 
those prayers must be offered toward the Qiblah, which is the 
direction to the Kabah, the holy shrine in Mecca.  Thus, the 
direction of a Muslim’s prayer is dependent on the orientation 
between that person’s current location and the Kabah.  Imam 
Muhammad estimated that 99.9% of Muslims in the United 
States pray in a northeast direction.  Habashis, however, 
contend that the Kabah is southeast from the United States, 
and they pray in that direction.  
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Taleem classes for Sunni Muslims at the prison.  Sharp 
regularly attended these services and classes.     
At some point, Sharp informed Imam Ibrahiym that he 
believed there were ideological differences between Sharp’s 
Habashi sect and the recognized Sunni group at SCI-
Pittsburgh.  Sharp believed that the Habashi could not be 
accommodated within the Sunni Muslim community at SCI-
Pittsburgh.  Imam Ibrahiym disagreed with Sharp’s assertion 
that the Habashi were not being accommodated and advised 
that if Sharp was a Sunni Muslim, as he claimed to be, then 
there was no reason why Sharp could not attend the services 
and programs that were offered to the Sunni Muslims at SCI-
Pittsburgh.   
On October 14, 1999, Sharp, on behalf of a purported 
group of Habashi members, submitted a typed document 
titled “Religious Accommodation Request for Ahlus Sunnati 
wal Jama’ah,” requesting recognition and accommodation of 
the Habashi sect.  In particular, Sharp sought space for 
separate Jumah services and Taleem classes on behalf of his 
purported group of 30 inmates.  Although the document 
submitted was not the DC-52 form required by DC-ADM 
819, it contained similar substantive information.     
 Imam Ibrahiym discussed this group request with 
Defendant Father William Terza, who was the Facility 
Chaplain Program Director and was responsible for 
overseeing the chaplaincy program at SCI-Pittsburgh.  Father 
Terza informed Sharp that his request was improperly 
submitted because it did not include an individual request on 
the proper DC-52 form, as required by DC-ADM 819.  Father 
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Terza told Sharp that once he submitted the proper form, 
Father Terza would circulate it to the appropriate SCI-
Pittsburgh staff members for their recommendation and then 
forward it to the DOC central office for a decision.  The 
District Court found that Sharp never submitted the proper 
individual request form to Father Terza.   
On November 28, 1999, a meeting was held between 
Defendant Mark Krysevig, who was the Deputy 
Superintendent at SCI-Pittsburgh, Defendant Rhoda 
Winstead, who was the Corrections Classification Program 
Manager (the “CCPM”) at SCI-Pittsburgh, Imam Ibrahiym, 
Father Terza and several inmates, including Sharp, to discuss 
SCI-Pittsburgh’s Ramadan services.  Specifically, discussions 
were held to determine how Ramadan, a month-long Muslim 
observance, would be accommodated among the various 
Muslim groups and inmates who wished to participate.  At 
this meeting, Sharp again — this time orally — raised his 
request for a group accommodation of his Habashi sect.   
On November 30, 1999, Sharp was placed in 
administrative custody (i.e., the restrictive housing unit) 
because, according to Defendants, Sharp’s efforts to organize 
a separate religious group were creating a threat to 
institutional security.  In particular, the prison officials found 
that Sharp was a danger to others, that he was attempting to 
establish himself as the leader of a group of inmates, and that 
he threatened disruption and violence if his religious group 
was not recognized.  Defendants Krysevig and William 
Stickman, who was the Deputy Superintendent for Facility 
Management at SCI-Pittsburgh, believed that Sharp was more 
interested in placing himself in a leadership position over a 
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group of inmates than obtaining a genuine religious 
accommodation.  Several inmates complained to Krysevig 
that Sharp was being disrespectful of their beliefs, and 
Krysevig was concerned that these other inmates might 
retaliate against Sharp.  In sum, Sharp was placed in 
administrative custody for “fomenting unrest in group 
activity.”   
On December 1, 1999, Sharp filed Grievance No. PIT-
0997-99 (the “Pittsburgh Grievance”) questioning why no 
determination had been issued with respect to his group 
request for accommodation.  On December 20, 1999, 
Winstead denied the Pittsburgh Grievance in writing, stating, 
in pertinent part:  
At the meeting you mention on November 28, 
1999 it was verified that all staff mentioned 
received a copy of your proposal [i.e., Sharp’s 
request for an accommodation]. 
In accordance with DC-ADM 819-3 for 
religious accommodations, you were to submit 
the proper form requesting such an 
accommodation for you as an individual. Any 
other inmates requesting an accommodation 
must be filed individually. Your form should be 
forwarded to the chaplaincy coordinator. Your 
form was improperly filed. 
The SCI-Pittsburgh Defendants testified that Sharp 
never submitted a form requesting religious accommodations 
for himself as an individual.  Sharp claims that he and other 
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Habashi members submitted handwritten, individual requests 
for accommodation to Imam Ibrahiym.  Imam Ibrahiym’s trial 
testimony on this issue was, at best, unclear.  Imam Ibrahiym 
testified that he never received a DC-52 form from Sharp or 
any other of the inmates that practice Habashi.  Later, Imam 
Ibrahiym testified that he received written requests for 
accommodation from Sharp, though the nature of these 
purported requests was unclear.4
Sharp appealed the denial of the Pittsburgh Grievance 
to Defendant Philip Johnson, who was Superintendent of SCI-
Pittsburgh.  On January 5, 2000, Johnson dismissed Sharp’s 
appeal as untimely.   
 
Sharp further claims that, while he was in 
administrative custody, Defendants proposed that he sign a 
behavioral modification contract that included a condition 
that he agree not to practice his religion in exchange for 
release into the general population.  SCI-Pittsburgh had a 
Program Review Committee (“PRC”) that would periodically 
meet with inmates confined to administrative custody and 
review their restricted status.   Defendants Krysevig and Joel 
Dickson, who was the Deputy Superintendent at SCI-
                                                 
4 The Magistrate Judge did not find Sharp’s claim that he 
submitted a handwritten, individual request to Imam Ibrahiym 
credible because Sharp could not produce a copy of this 
request at trial despite producing copies of all the other 
important documents in the case.  The Magistrate Judge also 
found Sharp’s claim belied by his grievance requests, which 
refer to group requests, not an individual request. 
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Pittsburgh, were on Sharp’s PRC.5  Because the PRC had 
“serious reservations” about releasing Sharp into the general 
population absent modification of his behavior, the PRC 
offered him the opportunity to agree to a behavioral 
modification contract.  Behavioral modification contracts 
were informal agreements between the institution and the 
inmate setting the terms of the inmate’s release from 
administrative custody.  If the inmate fails to comply with the 
terms of the contract, he can be returned to administrative 
custody.  The PRC proposed a behavioral modification 
contract to Sharp, the general terms of which were to include 
promises by Sharp to cease fomenting unrest and to refrain 
from showing disrespect for the religious beliefs and practices 
of others, in exchange for release from administrative 
custody.    Sharp was to draft the specific language of the 
contract.  Both Krysevig and Dickson testified that the PRC 
never made restrictions on Sharp’s practice of his religion a 
condition of his release from administrative custody.  Sharp 
never submitted a draft to — nor reached an agreement with 
— the PRC.6
On May 23, 2001, the DOC transferred Sharp from 
SCI-Pittsburgh to SCI-Greene. 
   
                                                 
5 Defendant Melvin Lockett, who was a Unit Manager at SCI-
Pittsburgh, was the third member of Sharp’s PRC.   
 
6 Collectively, Defendants Johnson, Krysevig, Dickson, 
Stickman, Winstead, Terza, and Ibrahiym are the “SCI-
Pittsburgh Defendants.”   
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B.  SCI-GREENE 
1. RELIGIOUS SERVICES OFFERED AND                                                                     
POLICIES FOR REQUESTING RELIGIOUS 
ACCOMMODATIONS       
SCI-Greene recognizes and accommodates several 
different religions and religious groups, namely Christians, 
Jews, Native Americans and Muslims.  With respect to 
Christianity, SCI-Greene offers Catholic, Protestant, 
Jehovah’s Witness and Yoke Fellowship services.  As to 
Islam, SCI-Greene offers Nation of Islam and Sunni services.  
Effective July 15, 2002, the DOC issued a revised DC-ADM 
819.  This revised policy stated, in pertinent part, that requests 
for religious accommodation were to be made as follows:    
a. Each inmate must use a DC-52, Inmate 
Religious Accommodation Request Form . . . 
to submit his/her request for accommodation to 
the FCPD [Facility Chaplaincy Program 
Director]. 
* * * 
c. The inmate shall obtain written information 
from his/her outside faith group, including any 
publications that describe the goals, beliefs, and 
practices of the group and supply this 
information to the FCPD for review. 
d. The Religious Accommodation Review 
Committee shall review each inmate’s request 
for a religious accommodation within 45 days 
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of receipt and forward a recommendation to the 
affected Regional Deputy Secretary. 
e. The Regional Deputy Secretary shall, within 
15 days of receiving the recommendation from 
the Director of the Bureau of Inmate 
Services/designee, approve/disapprove the 
request and notify the Director of the Bureau of 
Inmate Services of the decision. 
f. The Director, Bureau of Inmate Services 
shall, within 10 days, inform the Facility 
Manager and the FCPD of the requesting 
facility of the determination and ensure copies 
of all final determinations are provided to all 
Deputy Secretaries and Facility managers. The 
FCPD shall be responsible for informing the 
affected inmate of the outcome of his/her 
request no later than 10 working days from the 
date that the determination of 
approval/disapproval is received. 
g.   If an inmate is informed by the FCPD that 
the request will not be accommodated, the 
inmate may then file a grievance in accordance 
with Department policy DC-804, “Inmate 
Grievances.” Grievances may only be 
submitted after the inmate has received 
notification of the decision on the requested 
accommodation. 
15 
 
(emphasis in original).  The DOC did not make any 
substantive changes to the DC-52 Inmate Religious 
Accommodation Request Form. 
 Defendant Imam Abu Bakr Muhammad, who was the 
Muslim Chaplain at SCI-Greene, testified that he is a Sunni 
Muslim.  Imam Muhammad provided Taleem and led the 
weekly Jumah prayer services for Muslim inmates. 
2.   SHARP’S INCARCERATION AND                          
ACCOMMODATION REQUESTS AT SCI-GREENE  
On September 30, 2002, more than a year after being 
transferred to SCI-Greene, Sharp submitted a DC-52 form 
requesting an individual religious accommodation of his 
Habashi sect pursuant to DC-ADM 819.7
Defendant Father George Moneck, who was the 
Director of Chaplaincy at SCI-Greene, reviewed Sharp’s 
request and recommended that the DOC central office deny it.  
Father Moneck further commented on the form that Sharp 
“can practice his religion privately. [SCI-Greene] cannot 
  Sharp’s request 
sought, among other things, Jumah services and Taleem 
study, library space with books teaching his beliefs, prayer 
time at sunset during Ramadan with others who shared his 
beliefs, an outside coordinator on a weekly basis,  and a 
community bank account.   
                                                 
7 Sharp identified the formal name of his religion as “Islam as 
taught by the Ashariy Community of Ahlus Sunnah wal 
Jama’ah,” but he noted that it is commonly referred to as 
Habashi.   
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accommodate another Muslim sect. [Sharp] is most welcome 
to join the Sunni or the Nation of Islam communities.”  
Father Moneck circulated the vote form to the other 
staff members, who all recommended that Sharp’s request be 
denied.  Defendant Jean Mears, who was SCI-Greene’s 
CCPM, generally reviewed inmates’ requests for religious 
accommodation. Mears, however, was unavailable when 
Sharp’s request was circulated.  Michael Bruno, who was 
SCI-Greene’s acting CCPM at the time, reviewed and 
recommended that the DOC central office deny Sharp’s 
request.  Bruno is not a defendant in this action.  Stickman, 
who was promoted to Superintendent at SCI-Greene in 2002,8 
generally participated in reviewing inmates’ requests for 
religious accommodation.  Stickman, however, was 
unavailable and did not participate in the review of Sharp’s 
request.  Defendant Paul Stowitzky, who was SCI-Greene’s 
acting superintendent at the time, reviewed and recommended 
that the DOC central office deny Sharp’s request.9
                                                 
8 This is the same Defendant who was the Deputy 
Superintendent at SCI-Pittsburgh during Sharp’s incarceration 
at that prison. 
     
   
9 Two others voted to recommend that Sharp’s request be 
denied: the Major-of-the-Guard and the Deputy 
Superintendent for Centralized Services.  The record is not 
clear who these individuals are, and they do not appear to be 
named as defendants. 
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Father Moneck submitted Sharp’s request and the 
staff’s recommendations to the DOC’s central office for a 
final determination.  On December 18, 2002, the central 
office denied Sharp’s request.  Father Moneck informed 
Sharp that his request was denied because he was “able to 
attend existing Islamic services or practice [his] religion 
privately in [his] cell.”     
On December 26, 2002, Sharp submitted Grievance 
No. 39662 (the “Greene Grievance”), challenging the denial 
of his request for an accommodation.  Mears conducted the 
initial review and denied Sharp’s grievance because, in her 
estimation, Sharp was not denied the right to practice his faith 
or prohibited from maintaining his beliefs and praying in his 
cell.  Sharp appealed the denial of his grievance to Stickman.  
This appeal was dismissed as untimely.  Sharp did not submit 
any other requests for religious accommodation at SCI-
Greene.   
Sharp complained to Defendant Brian Coleman, who 
was the Security Captain at SCI-Greene, about the content of 
certain sermons given by Imam Muhammad.  Sharp 
specifically complained that Imam Muhammad made derisive 
comments about the Habashi sect and Sharp in particular.  
Coleman informed Mears of Sharp’s complaint.  Mears and 
Father Moneck reviewed the videotape of Imam 
Muhammad’s sermons and found nothing inflammatory.   
Sharp claimed that Coleman ordered his cell to be 
searched in order to confiscate Sharp’s religious materials.  
Coleman denied this and testified that he had never ordered a 
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search of an inmate’s cell specifically to retrieve religious 
materials.   
Sharp also claimed that Imam Muhammad would not 
allow him to participate in Ramadan services unless Sharp 
signed an agreement that he would not practice his Habashi 
faith.  Imam Muhammad denied this and testified that, 
although he did develop an agreement form for inmates 
wishing to participate in Ramadan, this form did not require 
the inmates to profess or practice a specified religion.10
On June 13, 2006, the DOC transferred Sharp from 
SCI-Greene to SCI-Dallas.   
   
                                                 
10 Collectively, Defendants Coleman, Mears, Moneck, 
Muhammad, Stowitzky, and Stickman are the “SCI-Greene 
Defendants.” Collectively, the SCI-Pittsburgh and Greene 
Defendants are the “Defendants.”   
The Magistrate Judge dismissed, among others, the 
following defendants prior to trial: Blaine, Miller, Fisher, 
Lockett, Matcus, and Blakey.  On appeal, Sharp has not 
expressly challenged the dismissal of these parties.  In fact, 
Sharp’s supplemental brief only references these individuals 
in the case caption.  Consequently, Sharp has abandoned any 
issues with respect to these individuals on appeal.  See, e.g., 
Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182-83 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993).  
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C.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On November 2, 2000, Sharp filed his complaint.11  
The case underwent years of motions practice and several of 
Sharp’s claims were dismissed prior to trial.12
On April 7, 2008, the Magistrate Judge entered 
judgment in favor of Defendants and set forth her findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in a comprehensive 
memorandum.  The Magistrate Judge found against Sharp on 
the First Amendment Action because, among other things: 
Sharp failed to comply with the DOC’s regulations regarding 
  Sharp’s First 
Amendment and RLUIPA Actions proceeded to a bench trial 
before the Magistrate Judge. 
                                                 
11 Counsel was appointed and represented Sharp for much of 
the pre-trial proceedings, but Sharp’s counsel, apparently at 
Sharp’s request, sought to withdraw prior to trial.  Thereafter, 
Sharp proceeded pro se, including at trial.   
 
12 By Order dated December 28, 2004, the Magistrate Judge 
granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and/or for summary 
judgment with respect to Sharp’s claims for: compensatory 
damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb; lost and/or destroyed property; and lost 
wages and employment opportunities. 
By Order dated December 28, 2005, the Magistrate 
Judge granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 
dismissing Sharp’s claims asserting violations of his rights 
under the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause. 
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individualized submissions (SCI-Pittsburgh); Sharp failed to 
meet his burden of demonstrating that denial of his request 
had no rational connection to any legitimate penological 
interest (SCI-Greene); the Defendants did not have any 
personal involvement in the denial of Sharp’s requests to 
support a § 1983 action (SCI-Pittsburgh and Greene); and 
Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity (SCI-
Pittsburgh and Greene).  The Magistrate Judge found against 
Sharp on the RLUIPA Action because, among other things: 
Sharp was not entitled to any relief under the statute; 
Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity; and in any 
event, Sharp’s claim failed on the merits.      
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Sharp appealed.13
II. DISCUSSION  
   
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.    We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
We apply a clearly erroneous standard when reviewing 
the findings of fact from a bench trial and a plenary standard 
to the conclusions of law.  Trustees of Nat’l Elevator Indus. 
Pension, Health Benefit & Educ. Funds v. Lutyk, 332 F.3d 
188, 191 (3d Cir. 2003). 
                                                 
13 On April 21, 2008, Sharp filed a pro se notice of appeal.  
After the initial briefs were submitted, we requested 
supplemental briefing and appointed counsel to represent 
Sharp. 
Defendants’ motion to strike Section VI of Sharp’s 
supplemental reply brief (“Section VI”) is currently pending 
before us.  Defendants assert that Section VI contains 
arguments regarding issues not raised in Sharp’s 
supplemental brief.  Sharp argues that these issues were 
raised in his informal brief, and that two of the three issues 
raised are a response to Defendant’s supplemental opposition 
brief.  We conclude that Section VI improperly exceeded the 
scope of Defendants’ supplemental opposition brief.  
Accordingly, we grant Defendants’ motion to strike Section 
VI in that we have given that portion of the brief no 
consideration in our decision. 
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A.  THE RLUIPA ACTION 
Sharp’s RLUIPA Action sought injunctive relief and 
money damages against Defendants in both their official and 
individual capacities.  The Magistrate Judge held that Sharp’s 
claims for injunctive relief were mooted by his transfer from 
SCI-Pittsburgh and SCI-Greene to SCI-Dallas, and that 
RLUIPA does not permit recovery against Defendants in their 
official or individual capacities.  On appeal, Sharp is 
challenging only the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his 
RLUIPA claim against Defendants in their individual 
capacities.  The issue of whether RLUIPA permits actions 
against State officials in their individual capacities is one of 
first impression for this Court.  For the reasons discussed 
below, we conclude that RLUIPA does not permit such 
actions.   
RLUIPA permits plaintiffs to “obtain appropriate relief 
against a government.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2.  
“[G]overnment,” in pertinent part, is defined as: 
(i)  a State, county, municipality, or other 
governmental entity created under the 
authority of a State; 
(ii)  any branch, department, agency, 
instrumentality, or official of an entity 
listed in clause (i); and 
(iii) any other person acting under color of 
State law[.] 
23 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A) (emphasis added).     
Sharp argues that the express language of RLUIPA, in 
particular the separate references to an “official” and “any 
other person acting under color of State law,” supports his 
position that Congress intended the statute to permit relief 
against government employees in their individual capacities.  
In particular, Sharp asserts that, by the “any other person 
acting under color of State law” language, Congress 
purposefully tracked its § 1983 language.  Sharp concludes 
that because § 1983 permits recovery against a government 
employee in her individual capacity, so too must RLUIPA.  
Sharp, however, overlooks the constitutional underpinnings 
of RLUIPA.  In fact, the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, 
Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits — the only circuits we 
are aware of that have addressed this issue in precedential 
opinions — have rejected arguments similar to Sharp’s and 
held that RLUIPA does not permit actions against 
government employees in their individual capacities.  See, 
e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 886-89 (7th Cir. 2009); 
Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186-89 (4th Cir. 2009); 
Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 327-29 
(5th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271-75 (11th 
Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds, Sossamon v. Texas, 
131 S. Ct. 1651, 1654 (2011) (abrogating Smith as to the 
claim against government employees in their official 
capacities).     
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Congress enacted RLUIPA pursuant to its spending 
power under Article I of the Constitution.14
Thus, non-recipients of the funds, including 
individuals who are state officials, generally cannot be subject 
to private liability for monetary damages.  See, e.g., Nelson, 
570 F.3d at 888-89 (stating that permitting suits against 
government officials in their individual capacity would “raise 
serious questions regarding whether Congress had exceeded 
its authority under the Spending Clause”); Rendelman, 569 
F.3d at 189 (concluding that the RLUIPA’s definition of 
“government” did not clearly convey Congress’s intent to 
impose a condition of individual liability pursuant to the 
  When Congress 
enacts legislation pursuant to its spending power, it may 
attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds and 
essentially create a contract between the federal government 
and the State recipient.  Smith, 502 F.3d at 1273; see also 
Nelson, 570 F.3d at 887 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. 
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).  As a result, the statute 
may, as a condition of the funding, “subject the grant 
recipient to liability in a private cause of action, but the 
spending power cannot be used to subject individual 
defendants, such as state employees, to individual liability in 
a private cause of action.”  Smith, 502 F.3d at 1274; see also 
Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 329.   
                                                 
14 Although Congress enacted RLUIPA pursuant to both its 
spending power and the Commerce Clause, see, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b), the parties have conceded that only 
Congress’s authority under the spending power is implicated 
here. 
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Spending Clause); Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 329 
(“Congressional enactments pursuant to the Spending Clause 
do not themselves impose direct liability on a non-party to the 
contract between the state and the federal government.”); 
Smith, 502 F.3d at 1273-74 (drawing an analogy to the court’s 
Title IX jurisprudence, which does not permit suits against 
individuals because Title IX was enacted pursuant to the 
Spending Clause). 
Moreover, when Congress desires to impose a 
condition under the Spending Clause, it is Congress’s burden 
to affirmatively impose the condition in clear and 
unmistakable statutory terms.  See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. 
& Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17.  In Pennhurst State School & 
Hospital, the Supreme Court stated that   
[t]he legitimacy of Congress’s power to 
legislate under the spending power thus rests on 
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly 
accepts the terms of the “contract.” . . . There 
can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a 
State is unaware of the conditions or is unable 
to ascertain what is expected of it.  Accordingly, 
if Congress intends to impose a condition on the 
grant of federal moneys, it must do so 
unambiguously. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
Here, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that 
RLUIPA does not permit an action against Defendants in 
their individual capacities.  Pennsylvania, not Defendants, 
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was the direct recipient of any federal funds.  Thus, RLUIPA 
cannot impose direct liability on Defendants, who were not 
parties to the contract created between Pennsylvania and the 
federal government.15
Further, RLUIPA does not unambiguously signal 
Congress’s intent to impose a condition of individual liability.  
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sossamon v. Texas 
— which reviewed the related issue of whether States, by 
accepting federal funds, waived sovereign immunity under 
RLUIPA — is particularly instructive.  In Sossamon, the 
Court held that States did not consent to waive their sovereign 
immunity with respect to RLUIPA suits for damages against 
State employees in their official capacities.  See 131 S. Ct. at 
1655.  The Court reasoned that RLUIPA’s authorization of 
“‘appropriate relief against a government,’ § 2000cc-2(a), 
[was] not an unequivocal expression of state consent” to 
waive sovereign immunity to suits for money damages.  Id. at 
1658-59.  Rather, the Court found RLUIPA’s “appropriate 
   
                                                 
15 Sharp’s reliance on Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 
(2004), for the proposition that Congress may regulate the 
actions of third parties under the Spending Clause, is 
misplaced.  In Sabri, Congress enacted the statute at issue, 18 
U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), pursuant to its powers under the Spending 
and the Necessary and Proper Clauses to protect its 
expenditures against local bribery and corruption.  Sabri, 541 
U.S. at 602, 605-07.  Here, however, Congress did not enact 
RLUIPA to protect its own expenditures, but rather it enacted 
RLUIPA to protect the religious rights of institutionalized 
persons.  Thus, Sabri is inapposite.   
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relief” language to be  “open-ended and ambiguous about 
what types of relief it includes,” thereby precluding any 
finding that the States consented to waive sovereign 
immunity.   Id. at 1659.  Similarly here, it cannot be said that 
RLUIPA’s “appropriate relief” language unambiguously 
signaled Congress’s intent to impose a condition of individual 
liability.       
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge did not err when 
she entered judgment against Sharp and for Defendants on the 
RLUIPA Action. 
B.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT ACTION 
We will affirm the judgment for Defendants on the 
First Amendment Action because the Magistrate Judge did 
not err in concluding that Defendants were protected by 
qualified immunity (discussed in greater detail infra Section 
II.B.2).  The Magistrate Judge, however, did err in placing the 
burden on Sharp to demonstrate that the denial of his request 
had no rational connection to any legitimate penological 
interest.  Although this error ultimately does not affect our 
holding, we discuss it next to provide clarity and avoid future 
confusion.  
1. THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE ERRED IN PLACING THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF REGARDING THE PENOLOGICAL 
INTEREST FACTOR ON SHARP 
Inmates do not completely forego their constitutional 
rights because of their incarcerated status, but those rights are 
necessarily limited.  Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 
(3d Cir. 1999) (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 
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433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977)).  An inmate retains his First 
Amendment rights that are “not inconsistent with his status as 
a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the 
corrections system.”  Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 
(1974); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
In Turner, the Supreme Court recognized that 
subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to a 
strict scrutiny analysis would impede the officials’ ability to 
anticipate and solve security and administrative problems.  
482 U.S. at 89.  Instead, the Court found that “when a prison 
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the 
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”  Id.  The Court listed four factors that 
are relevant in determining the reasonableness of a particular 
prison regulation: (1) there must be a “valid, rational 
connection” between the prison regulation and the legitimate, 
neutral governmental interest put forward to justify it (the 
“First Turner Factor”); (2) whether the inmate has alternative 
means of exercising the right at issue; (3) the burden that the 
accommodation would impose on prison resources; and (4) 
whether any ready alternatives to the regulation exist that 
would fully accommodate the inmate’s rights at de minimis 
cost to valid penological objectives  (Turner factors 2-4 are 
the “Other Turner Factors”). Id. at 89-91 (quoting Block v. 
Rutherford, 486 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).16
                                                 
16 Note that the prisons do not have to use the least restrictive 
means possible to further legitimate penological interests.  
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.  
  Turner does not 
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expressly state which party, the inmate or the prison, bears 
the burden of proving these factors. 
After Turner, we developed a two-step analysis for 
determining whether a prison’s regulation is reasonably 
related to a penological interest.  First, the prison has the 
burden of demonstrating the First Turner Factor.  See 
Waterman, 183 F.3d at 218 n.9; Wolf v. Ashcroft, 297 F.3d 
305, 308 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2002).  This burden is slight, and in 
certain instances, the connection may be a matter of common 
sense.  Wolf, 297 F.3d at 308.  Second, if the prison meets its 
burden under the First Turner Factor, then we consider the 
Other Turner Factors.  See Waterman, 183 F.3d at 218 n.9; 
Wolf, 297 F.3d at 308 & n.2; see also Jones v. Brown, 461 
F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2006). 
After our decisions in Waterman and Wolf, the 
Supreme Court, in Overton v. Bazzetta, stated that where an 
inmate challenges regulations, the burden “is not on the State 
to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner 
to disprove it.”  539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).  Notably, Overton 
did not expressly state that the burden for the First Turner 
Factor is on the inmate.      
In Jones v. Brown, we interpreted Overton as placing 
the “ultimate burden of persuasion with regard to the 
reasonableness of a regulation” on the inmate but continued 
to require that the prison “put forward the legitimate 
governmental interest alleged to justify the regulation and 
demonstrate that the policy drafters could rationally have seen 
a connection between the policy and [that interest].”  Jones, 
461 F.3d at 360-61 (citations and quotation marks omitted 
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(alteration in original)).  Other Third Circuit decisions have 
followed Jones.  See, e.g., Fontroy v. Beard, 559 F.3d 173, 
177 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Although the Inmates bear the ultimate 
burden of showing that the DOC’s new mail policy is 
unconstitutional, it is the DOC Officials’ burden to 
demonstrate that a rational connection exists between the 
policy and a legitimate penological interest.”); Monroe v. 
Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 207 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that the 
party challenging the regulation bears the burden of showing 
that it is unreasonable, but that the prison must come forward 
with a legitimate interest justifying the regulation). 
Here, the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that 
Overton overruled, sub silentio, our Jones line of cases that 
placed the burden for the First Turner Factor on the prison.  
See Sharp v. Johnson, No. 00 civ. 2156, 2008 WL 941686, at 
*12 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2008) (placing the burden on Sharp to 
“negative every conceivable legitimate penological interest 
which might support [Defendants’] denial of the 
accommodation”).  First, Overton’s burden language does not 
support the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the burdens of 
production and persuasion for all Turner factors fall on those 
challenging the regulations.  See, e.g., Overton, 539 U.S. at 
132.  In other words, Overton did not tie its burden language 
to the Turner factors; rather, it made a statement about the 
general burden of persuasion where a prisoner is challenging 
a regulation.   
Second, Jones is binding Third Circuit precedent, and 
it interpreted Overton’s burden language to mean that the 
“ultimate burden of persuasion” — not the burden to prove 
the First Turner Factor — is on the inmate.  Jones, 461 F.3d 
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at 360-61.   In fact, the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in 
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (“Banks”) supports 
Jones’s interpretation of Overton.  In Banks, an inmate 
challenged the prison’s policy of restricting certain 
periodicals and photographs.  Banks, citing Overton, stated 
that the prisoner “bears the burden of persuasion” when he is 
challenging a regulation, 548 U.S. at 529, and that “Turner 
requires prison authorities to show more than a formalistic 
logical connection between a regulation and a penological 
objective.”17  548 U.S. at 535.18
                                                 
17 This is consistent with Turner, where the Court stated that 
“there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison 
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put 
forward to justify it.”  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis added).  Commonsense dictates 
that only the prison officials, not the inmates, would be 
putting forth a legitimate governmental interest to support the 
regulation. 
   
  
18 Defendants’ assertion that Banks is inapposite because it 
was presented to the Supreme Court in a different procedural 
posture (i.e., a motion for summary judgment) than the instant 
matter is not persuasive.  Banks stated that Turner, not 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, requires prison 
authorities to demonstrate the connection between a 
regulation and its penological interest.  See, e.g., 548 U.S. at 
535.  Thus, Banks is applicable to the instant matter.            
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Third, contrary to Defendants’ assertion, we see no 
internal inconsistency in our jurisprudence on the placement 
of the burden for the First Turner Factor.  In Newman v. 
Beard, a case cited by Defendants, we upheld the dismissal of 
the inmate’s First Amendment claim on a 12(b)(6) motion 
because the inmate did not allege that the regulation at issue 
served no legitimate penological objectives or was not 
reasonably related to rehabilitation.  617 F.3d 775, 781 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Newman involved a pleading deficiency, not a 
determination as to the burden of proof at trial.   
In Williams v. Morton, the other case cited by 
Defendants for the proposition that our jurisprudence is 
inconsistent, we granted summary judgment for the prison 
officials and stated that the inmates “have the burden of 
disproving the validity of the regulation.”  343 F.3d 212, 218 
(3d Cir. 2003).  This is essentially the same burden statement 
set forth in Overton, which we interpreted in Jones to mean 
the general burden of persuasion.  In fact, the prison 
administrators in Williams set forth a number of legitimate 
penological interests to support their regulation.  See, e.g., 
343 F.3d at 218 (listing simplified food service, prison 
security, and budgetary constraints as legitimate penological 
interests supporting the prison’s refusal to serve Halal meat).  
Neither Newman nor Williams stated that they were deviating 
from the established Third Circuit precedent set forth in Jones 
and its progeny.  We are satisfied that our jurisprudence on 
this issue is consistent.     
Finally, policy concerns favor placing the burden of 
the First Turner Factor on prison officials.  According to the 
Magistrate Judge, for Sharp to meet his burden of proving the 
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First Turner Factor, he would have to accomplish the 
herculean task of negating “every conceivable legitimate 
penological interest which might support” the denial of his 
accommodation.  Defendants argue that a prisoner seeking a 
religious accommodation would merely have to show no 
impact on security, orderly administration of the prison, or 
expenditures.  Defendants, however, ignore the fact that 
within these three broad categories are numerous sub-
categories of potential penological interests that an inmate 
would also have to negate (e.g., the interests within 
expenditures would include: additional guard salary/overtime, 
purchase of religious books, space concerns within the library 
and prayer areas, additional chaplain expenses, and potential 
speaker fees).  Placing this burden on prisoners unnecessarily 
creates inefficiencies and would invite speculation into the 
often subjective motivations of prison officials.   
Consequently, policy implications favor placing the burden 
on the prison officials. 
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge erred in placing the 
burden for the First Turner Factor on Sharp.  This error, 
however, was not fatal to the judgment on the First 
Amendment Action because Defendants were entitled to 
qualified immunity.   
2. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY  
 As an initial matter, the Magistrate Judge did not err in 
determining that Defendants did not waive their qualified 
immunity defense.  We review a lower court’s decision 
regarding the waiver of an affirmative defense for abuse of 
discretion.  See, e.g., Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Group, Inc., 460 
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F.3d 494, 506 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Eddy v. V.I. Water & 
Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).19
 Here, Defendants, who pled qualified immunity as an 
affirmative defense, placed Sharp on notice of their intent to 
raise that defense at trial.  Defendants’ delay in asserting 
qualified immunity was understandable because trial 
testimony was necessary to develop the contours of Sharp’s 
  Qualified 
immunity is an affirmative defense and generally must be 
included in a responsive pleading or may be considered 
waived.  See, e.g., Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 161 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (stating that qualified immunity is an affirmative 
defense); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).  Although it is true 
that parties should generally assert affirmative defenses early 
in the litigation, there is no firm rule.  See Cetel, 460 F.3d at 
506.  Thus, affirmative defenses may be raised at any time, 
even after trial, so long as the plaintiff suffers no prejudice.   
See Cetel, 460 F.3d at 506 (citing Charpentier v. Godsil, 937 
F.2d 859, 863-64 (3d Cir. 1991)).  A party may raise qualified 
immunity as a defense at trial, especially where the facts are 
not clear.   See Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 
2002) (stating that fact issues may require a trial before 
determining whether qualified immunity is appropriate); 
Eddy, 256 F.3d at 210 n.3 (stating in dicta that qualified 
immunity may be raised at trial). 
                                                 
19 A court abuses its discretion when its decision “rests upon a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law 
or an improper application of law to fact.”  Oddi v. Ford 
Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 
(3d Cir.1993)).  
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claims and to determine certain factual issues, including the 
number of Habashi adherents at SCI-Pittsburgh and Greene.  
Sharp, who was proceeding pro se at trial, did not incur any 
unnecessary legal fees as a result of Defendants’ delay, and 
he has not identified any substantial prejudice caused by the 
delay.  If anything, Sharp may have benefited from the delay 
because he was afforded the opportunity to introduce 
evidence at trial demonstrating that qualified immunity was 
improper under the circumstances.  Consequently, the 
Magistrate Judge did not abuse her discretion by permitting 
Defendants to raise their qualified immunity defense at trial.   
 The Magistrate Judge also did not err in holding that 
Defendants were protected by qualified immunity because 
they did not violate Sharp’s clearly established rights.  We 
review the grant of qualified immunity de novo as it raises a 
purely legal issue.  See Burns v. PA Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 
163 (3d Cir. 2011).  The qualified immunity doctrine 
“protects government officials from liability for civil damages 
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 
(2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Ray 
v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010).  
“Qualified immunity balances two important interests — the 
need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise 
power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their 
duties reasonably.”  Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.  Qualified 
immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those 
who knowingly violate the law.”  Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 
335, 341 (1986); see also Ray, 626 F.3d at 173-74.  Thus, so 
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long as an official reasonably believes that his conduct 
complies with the law, qualified immunity will shield that 
official from liability.  See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244.    
In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court established a 
two-part analysis for determining when qualified immunity is 
applicable: (1) whether the official’s conduct violated a 
constitutional or federal right; and (2) whether the right at 
issue was “clearly established.”  533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), 
overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (relaxing the 
Saucier analysis by no longer requiring courts to determine 
the Saucier prongs in sequential order); see also Ray, 626 
F.3d at 174. 
 A right is clearly established for qualified immunity 
purposes where its contours are “sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right.”  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202; see also 
Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 2006).  In 
determining whether a right has been clearly established, the 
court must define the right allegedly violated at the 
appropriate level of specificity.  Williams, 455 F.3d at 191 
(citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)).  In some 
cases, even though there may be no previous precedent 
directly on point, an action can still violate a clearly 
established right where a general constitutional rule already 
identified in the decisional law applies with obvious clarity.  
Williams, 455 F.3d at 191 (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 
730, 741 (2002)). 
At issue here is whether Sharp had a clearly 
established right under the First Amendment to separate 
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religious services in accordance with the Habashi sect of 
Sunni Islam when Sunni Islamic services were already 
available.  The Supreme Court has stated that “[a] special 
chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every 
faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or 
minister be provided without regard to the extent of the 
demand.”  Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972).  We 
echoed this when we said, “The requirement that a state 
interpose no unreasonable barriers to the free exercise of an 
inmate’s religion cannot be equated with the suggestion that 
the state has an affirmative duty to provide, furnish, or supply 
every inmate with a clergyman or religious services of his 
choice.”  Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 
1970).  Although we later stated that “an opportunity to 
worship as a congregation by a substantial number of 
prisoners may be a basic religious experience and, therefore, a 
fundamental exercise of religion by a bona fide religious 
group,” Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762, 768 (3d Cir. 1996),20
                                                 
20 Small held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993 (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, applies to prisoners’ 
claims.  98 F.3d at 768.  Subsequent to our decision in Small, 
the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores declared the 
RFRA unconstitutional.  521 U.S. 507 (1997).  Although 
Small has been overruled in part by Boerne, Small’s finding 
that communal worship by a substantial number of prisoners 
may be a fundamental aspect of the exercise of religion is still 
good law in the Third Circuit. 
 
we have never indicated, let alone clearly established, that a 
single prisoner or a non-substantial number of like-minded 
prisoners are entitled to place on the state the burden of 
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furnishing separate religious services for them.21  Given this 
precedent, a reasonable official would not have understood 
the denial of Sharp’s request, whether made by Sharp on 
behalf of either himself or a small number of inmates, to 
violate a constitutional right.22
                                                 
21 Cf. Smith v. Kyler, 295 F. App’x 479, 483-84 (3d Cir. 
2008) (determining an inmate’s Free Exercise rights were not 
violated by a DOC policy prohibiting group worship in the 
absence of an approved faith group leader); Boretsky v. 
Corzine, No. 08 civ. 2265, 2011 WL 2610370, at *13 (D.N.J. 
June 30, 2011) (holding that a Jewish inmate’s restriction 
from congregational services as well as communal activities 
did not violate his constitutional rights); Palmer v. Rustin, 
No. 10 civ. 0042, 2011 WL 2489820, at *9 (W.D. Pa. June 
21, 2011) (dismissing a claim based on denial of right to 
attend Muslim services); Gould v. Beard, No. 07 civ. 0055, 
2010 WL 845566, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2010) (holding 
that a prisoner did not have a right to communal Nation of 
Islam services); Morris-El v. Menei, No. 00 civ. 200J, 2006 
WL 1455592, at *2-6 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2006) (denying 
claim that failure to provide Moorish Science services 
violated the inmate’s right to Free Exercise).  
 
 
22 Sharp further argues that, pursuant to Grant v. City of 
Pittsburgh, the Magistrate Judge erred by not conducting a 
careful examination of the record and detailing a factual 
description of each defendant’s actions.  98 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 
1996) (denying qualified immunity because the district court 
did not analyze the specific conduct of each defendant).  This 
is a red herring.  Although the Magistrate Judge did state in a 
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Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity as to Sharp’s First Amendment Action.23
                                                                                                             
conclusory fashion that “the evidence shows that the 
Defendants acted reasonably,” she only did so after making 
factual findings as to the involvement of each SCI-Pittsburgh 
and Greene Defendant with respect to Sharp’s First 
Amendment Action.  Thus, the Magistrate Judge did conduct 
a proper examination of the record. 
 
  
23 Sharp’s informal brief also expressly asserted that the 
Magistrate Judge erred when she: (1) determined that he 
waived his retaliation claim; and (2) dismissed his due 
process claim.  We disagree.   
Prior to trial, the Magistrate Judge found that Sharp’s 
amended complaint did not include any retaliation claims in 
the section identified as “Legal Claims.”  The Magistrate 
Judge was unsure whether this omission was intentional.  
Thus, the Magistrate Judge directed Sharp to “identify any 
retaliation claim he intends to pursue in a separate paragraph 
within the section of his [second amended complaint] wherein 
he sets forth his legal claims.”  Sharp, who was represented 
by counsel at that time, filed his second amended complaint, 
but did not include retaliation claims in the legal claims 
section.  Sharp never sought to amend his second amended 
complaint to include a retaliation claim.  Because Sharp 
omitted his retaliation claim in his second amended 
complaint, the Magistrate Judge did not err in concluding that 
Sharp waived this claim. 
The Magistrate Judge also did not err in granting 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Sharp’s due 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment in favor of Defendants. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
process claim.  Sharp claims that his confinement in 
administrative custody for thirty months violated his 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.  Sharp, however, 
failed to demonstrate that he was not afforded proper due 
process protections.  We have previously upheld the 
constitutionality of the DOC’s policy statement 802, which 
sets forth the policies and procedures for confining inmates to 
administrative custody and the PRC’s periodic review of their 
status.  See Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 145-46 (3d Cir. 
2000).  Sharp has not argued that the DOC’s policy statement 
802 has been substantively amended since Shoats or that the 
DOC failed to follow this policy. 
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge did not err in 
determining that he waived his retaliation claim or in 
dismissing his due process claim.   
 
